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CONVEX ANALYSIS FOR LQG SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS
TO MAJOR MINOR LQG MEAN-FIELD GAME SYSTEMS∗
DENA FIROOZI † , SEBASTIAN JAIMUNGAL† , AND PETER E. CAINES‡
Abstract.
A convex analysis approach to the solution of LQG stochastic control problems is developed and
applied to major-minor (MM) LQG mean-field game (MFG) systems. The approach retrieves the
best response strategies for the major agent and all minor agents yielding a Nash equilibrium and
an associated ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, in contrast to the classical approach, the imposition
of assumptions on the evolution of the mean-field is avoided.
Key words. convex analysis, LQG systems, major-minor mean-field games
1. Introduction. Various approaches such as calculus of variations, stochastic
maximum principle, dynamic programming, square completion and change of func-
tional have been used to address deterministic linear quadratic (LQ) and stochastic
linear quadratic (LQG) optimal control problems [23, 21, 3, 1]. The convex analysis
approach to optimization for static systems, instead, uses the criteria of a vanishing
Gaˆteaux derivative of the optimization functional (see e.g., [10], [17]) to seek op-
timality. [6] establishes the relationship between the Gaˆteaux derivative of the cost
functional of a stochastic dynamical system and its Hamiltonian. The convex analysis
approach to stochastic optimization has been applied in several financial related con-
text, including, [9] which studies portfolio optimization, [2] which studies a stochastic
tracking problem in finance, and [7, 8] which analyses an algorithmic trading problem
with heterogeneous agents. [15] and [14] use a convex analysis approach to obtain
the best response strategies for a general class of major-minor LQG mean-field game
(MM LQG MFG) systems which include common noise and latent processes.
In this work, we take a convex analysis approach to derive the solutions to LQG
optimal control problems. We then apply the methodology to MM LQGMFG systems
addressed in [18] to retrieve the best response strategies for the major agent and each
individual minor agent. The main features of the convex analysis approach presented
here are summarized in the following points:
- In the absence of a major agent, the mean-field is deterministic and can be
computed offline. In the presence of a major agent, however, the mean-field
becomes stochastic. In the classical approach towards MM LQG MFG (see
e.g. [18, 24, 11, 12, 13, 16, 5] and [19] for an application in algorithmic trading,
see also [25] for MM nonlinear MFG analysis), one first derives heuristic
dynamics for the mean-field in the infinite population limit, and then extends
the major and minor agents’ state space to establish the existence of an ǫ-
Nash equilibrium and obtain the individual agents’ control laws that yield
the equilibrium. In contrast, our approach makes no prior assumptions on
the evolution of the mean-field and instead we derive the mean-field equation
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– an important and distinctive advantage to the approach adopted in this
paper which has the following additional features:
- It helps to elucidate the impact that agents, both major and minor, have on
one another and on the overall system.
- It leads to a direct characterization of the optimal control actions in stochastic
optimal control problems.
- And it permits one to deal with non-standard problems (e.g. [15, 14, 7, 8]),
where the classical results do not apply; this is because the formulation in
this paper readily generalizes to these more sophisticated cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a convex
analysis approach using Gaˆteaux derivatives for static systems. Section 3 extends
these methods to construct the solution to single-agent LQG problems. Finally, in
Section 4, we further extend the approach so as to retrieve the best response strategies
for MM LQG MFG systems.
2. Convex Analysis Overview. Let V be a reflexive Banach space, with cor-
responding dual space V ∗, and V be a non-empty closed convex subset of V .
Definition 2.1 (Gaˆteaux Derivative [10, 17]). The function J defined on a
neighbourhood of u ∈ V with values in R is Gaˆteaux differentiable at u in the direction
of ω ∈ V if there exists DJ(u) ∈ V ∗ such that
〈DJ(u), ω〉 = lim
ǫ→0
J(u + ǫ ω)− J(u)
ǫ
.(2.1)
The function DJ(u) is called the Gaˆteaux derivative of J at u.
Theorem 2.2 (Euler Inequality). Assume J is convex, continuous, proper, and
Gaˆteaux differentiable with continuous derivative DJ(u). Then
(2.2) J(u) = inf
v∈V
J(v),
if and only if
(2.3) 〈DJ(u), v − u〉 ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V.

Remark 2.3 (Euler Equality). In Theorem 2.2 for the case where V = V , ω =
v − u generates the whole space V , and therefore (2.3) reduces to Euler equality
(2.4) 〈DJ(u), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ V,
which implies that
(2.5) J(u) = inf
v∈V
J(v) ⇔ DJ(u) = 0.
The Banach space in this paper is the space of square-integrable Rm-valued mea-
surable functions.
3. Single-Agent LQG Problems. In this section, we rederive the solution to
single-agent LQG problems using a convex analysis method.
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3.1. Dynamics. Consider single-agent LQG systems with governing dynamics
dxt = (Axt +B ut + b(t)) dt+ σ(t) dwt,(3.1)
where t ≥ 0, and the continuous processes xt ∈ R
n, ut ∈ R
m, and wt ∈ R
r denote,
respectively, the state, the control action, and a standard Wiener process. Moreover,
A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, and b(t) ∈ Rn, σ(t) ∈ Rn×r, are deterministic, continuous
and bounded functions of time.
3.1.1. Control σ-Fields. We denote by F := (Ft)t∈T, where T := [0, T ], the
natural filtration generated by the agent’s state (xt)t∈T. The admissible set of controls
U is the set of feedback control laws u = (ut)t∈T that are F -adapted R
m-valued
continuous processes such that E[
∫ T
0 u
⊺
t utdt] <∞, for any finite T .
3.2. Cost Functional. The cost functional to be minimized is given by
(3.2)
J(u) = 12E
[
e−ρTx⊺TGxT +
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
x⊺tQxt + 2 x
⊺
tNut + u
⊺
tRut − 2 x
⊺
t η − 2 u
⊺
t n
}
dt
]
,
where G,Q ∈ Rn×n, N ∈ Rn×m, R ∈ Rm×m, η ∈ Rn, n ∈ Rm, denote the weight
matrices and ρ ∈ R denotes the discount rate.
Assumption 3.1. For the cost functional (3.2) to be convex, we assume G ≥ 0,
R > 0, and Q−NR−1N⊺ > 0.
3.3. Optimal Control Action. The system dynamics (3.1) together with the
cost functional (3.2) constitute a stochastic LQ optimal control problem, which we
solve using the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Gaˆteaux Derivative of Cost for LQG Systems). For the class of
LQG systems described by (3.1)-(3.2), the Gaˆteaux derivative of the cost functional is
(3.3) 〈DJ(u), ω〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
ω⊺t
{
e−ρtN⊺xt + e
−ρtRut − e
−ρtn
+B⊺
(
e−A
⊺tMt −
∫ t
0
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qxs +Nus − η)ds
)}
dt
]
,
where ω lies in the space U and (Mt)t∈T is a martingale given by
Mt = E
[
e−ρT eA
⊺TGxT +
∫ T
0
e−ρseA
⊺s(Qxs +Nus − η
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft].(3.4)

Proof. The solution xt to the state representation of the system (3.1) subject to
the control action ut is
xt = e
Atx0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)
(
Bus + b(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)σ(s)dws,(3.5)
where x0 ∈ R
n and φ(t, s) = eA(t−s), ∀ s ≤ t ≤ T, denote, respectively, the initial
state and the state transition matrix for the system (3.1).
Let xǫ denote the solution to (3.1) subject to a perturbed control action u + ǫω
in the direction of ω ∈ U . It is given by
(3.6)
xǫt = e
Atx0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)
(
Bus + b(s)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)σ(s) dws + ǫ
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)Bωs ds.
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Substituting (3.5) into (3.6) implies
(3.7) xǫt = xt + ǫ
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)Bωs ds
or equivalently (from differentiating both sides)
dxǫt = dxt + ǫBωt dt+ ǫA
∫ t
0
eA(t−s)Bωs ds.(3.8)
The cost of the perturbed control action u+ǫω and the corresponding perturbed state
xǫ is
(3.9) J(u+ ǫω) = 12E
[
e−ρT (xǫT )
⊺GxǫT +
∫ T
0
e−ρs
{
(xǫs)
⊺Qxǫs
+ 2(xǫs)
⊺N(us + ǫωs) + (us + ǫωs)
⊺R(us + ǫωs)− 2(x
ǫ
s)
⊺η − 2(us + ǫωs)
⊺n
}
ds
]
.
Using integration by parts for Itoˆ processes [22], allows us to rewrite the terminal cost
as
(3.10) e−ρT (xǫT )
⊺GxǫT = (x0)
⊺Gx0 +
∫ T
0
d
(
e−ρs(xǫs)
⊺Gxǫs
)
= (x0)
⊺Gx0 − ρ
∫ T
0
e−ρs(xǫs)
⊺Gxǫs ds+ 2
∫ T
0
e−ρs(xǫs)
⊺Gdxǫs
+
∫ T
0
e−ρsσ(s)⊺Gσ(s) ds.
Substituting (3.10) and then (3.7)-(3.8) into (3.9), and collecting terms, we have
(3.11) J(u+ ǫω) = J(u) + E
[
ǫ
∫ T
0
e−ρs
{(∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωt dt
)⊺(
Gdxs
+ (Qxs +Nus +A
⊺Gxs − ρGxs − η) ds
)
+
(
(xs)
⊺Nωs + (xs)
TGBωs
+ (us)
⊺Rωs − n
⊺ωs
)
ds
}
+ ǫ2
∫ T
0
e−ρs
{(∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωtdt
)⊺(
GA
∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωtdt
− ρG
∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωtdt+GBωs +Q
∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωtdt+Nωs
)
+ (ωs)
⊺Rωs
)}
ds
]
.
The Gaˆteaux derivative of DJ(u) in the direction of ω is obtained by subtracting
J(u), dividing both sides of the equation by ǫ, and finally taking the limit as ǫ → 0.
The result is
(3.12)
〈DJ(u), ω〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρs
{(∫ s
0
eA(s−t)Bωtdt
)⊺(
Gdxs + (Qxs +Nus +A
⊺Gxs
− ρGxs − η)ds
)
+
(
x⊺sNωs + x
⊺
sGBωs + u
⊺
sRωs − n
⊺ωs
)
ds
}]
.
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We substitute (3.1) to rewrite the double integral in (3.12) as
(3.13)
∫ T
0
{∫ s
0
e−ρsω⊺t B
⊺eA
⊺(s−t)Gσ(s)dtdws +
∫ s
0
e−ρsω⊺t B
⊺eA
⊺(s−t)
×
(
GAxs +GBus +Gb(s) +Qxs +Nus +A
⊺Gxs − ρGxs − η
)
dtds
}
.
Let us denote by φ := (φt,s)0≤t≤s≤T , where
(3.14) φt,s = e
−ρsω⊺t B
⊺eA
⊺(s−t)Gσ(s).
Given that (i) φt,s is Ft × B(R)-measurable, where B(R) denotes the smallest σ-
algebra that contains the open intervals of R, (ii) every realization of φt,s is bounded
∀s ∈ R, t ∈ T, (iii)
∫ T
t φt,sdws is Ft × B(R)-measurable ∀t ∈ T; the conditions of
the stochastic version of Fubini’s theorem [20] hold. Moreover, since the processes
in the second term of (3.13) are continuous, the conditions of the ordinary Fubini’s
theorem hold [26]. Applying Fubini’s theorem to change the order of integration in
(3.12) results in
〈DJ(u), ω〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
ω⊺t
{
e−ρtB⊺Gxt + e
−ρtN⊺xt + e
−ρtRut − e
−ρtn
+B⊺
∫ T
t
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)
(
Gdxs +
(
((A⊺ − ρI)G+Q)xs +Nus − η
)
ds
)}]
dt.
(3.15)
Integrating by parts once again, we have∫ T
t
eA
⊺(s−t)−ρs ((A⊺ − ρI)Gxsds+Gdxs)
=
∫ T
t
d(eA
⊺(s−t)e−ρsGxs) = e
−ρT eA
⊺(T−t)GxT − e
−ρtGxt,
(3.16)
and substituting into (3.15) yields
(3.17)
〈DJ(u), ω〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
ω⊺t
{
e−ρTB⊺eA
⊺(T−t)GxT + e
−ρtN⊺xt + e
−ρtRut − e
−ρtn
+B⊺
∫ T
t
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qxs +Nus − η
)
ds
}
dt
]
.
Using the smoothing property of conditional expectations [4], the Gaˆteaux derivative
(3.17) may be rewritten as
(3.18) 〈DJ(u), ω〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
ω⊺t
{
e−ρtN⊺xt + e
−ρtRut − e
−ρtn
+B⊺E
[
e−ρT eA
⊺(T−t)GxT +
∫ T
t
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qxs +Nus − η
)
ds
∣∣∣Ft]
}
dt
]
.
Next, defining the martingale M given in (3.4) allows us to rewrite (3.18) as stated
in (3.3).
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We next provide the form of the optimal control action in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (LQG Optimal Control Action). Given Assumption 3.1, the op-
timal control action for the LQG system (3.1)-(3.2) is
(3.19)
u∗t = −R
−1
[
N⊺x∗t − n+B
⊺eρt
(
e−A
⊺tMt −
∫ t
0
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qx∗s +Nu
∗
s − η)ds
)]
.

Proof. From Theorem 2.2 and Remark 2.3, a necessary condition for u∗ ∈ U to
be the optimal control action is
〈DJ(u∗), ω〉 = 0, a.s. for all ω ∈ U .(3.20)
Moreover, as Assumption 3.1 holds, (3.20) is also sufficient.
From (3.3), equation (3.20) holds if and only if
u∗t = −R
−1
[
N⊺x∗t − n+B
⊺eρt
(
e−A
⊺tMt −
∫ t
0
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qx∗s +Nu
∗
s − η)ds
)]
.
(3.21)
To show this, first by direct substitution of (3.21) into (3.3) we have 〈DJ(u∗), ω〉 =
0 for all ω ∈ U . Next, suppose that 〈DJ(u∗), ω〉 = 0, for all ω ∈ U , but (3.21) does
not hold on a measurable set B ⊂ Ω× T with strictly positive measure. Then define
ω˜ such that
(3.22) ω˜t = e
−ρtN⊺x∗t + e
−ρtRu∗t − e
−ρtn
+B⊺eρt
(
e−A
⊺tMt −
∫ t
0
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qx∗s +Nu
∗
s − η)ds
)
,
so that by assumption P
(∫ T
0 |ω˜t|dt > 0
)
> 0.
We next show that ω˜ ∈ U . By definition w˜t is Ft-measurable. Moreover, using
Jensen’s, Cauchy Schwarz and triangle inequalities, we have
(3.23) E
[∫ T
0
ω˜⊺t ω˜tdt
]
≤ 2
[
λE‖x0‖
2 + κE
∫ T
0
‖u∗t‖
2dt+ γ
]
<∞,
since u∗t ∈ U , and hence E
∫ T
0 ‖u
∗
t‖
2dt <∞, E‖x0‖
2 = ‖x0‖
2 <∞,
λ =
(
2α
∫ T
0
‖eAt‖2dt+ 2β‖eAT‖2
)
<∞,(3.24)
κ = 4T ‖N‖2
( ∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA⊺(s−t)∥∥∥2 dsdt)+ 2‖R‖2
+ 2(β + αT )‖B‖2
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA(T−s)∥∥∥2 ds <∞,
(3.25)
γ = ‖n‖2T + 4T 2‖η‖2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA⊺(s−t)∥∥∥2 dsdt
+ 2(Tα+ β)


∥∥∥∥∥
∫ T
0
eA(T−s)b(s)ds
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ 2T
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA(T−s)σ(s)∥∥∥2 ds

 <∞,
(3.26)
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(3.27) α = ‖N⊺‖2 + 4T ‖Q‖2
(∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∥∥∥eA⊺(s−t)∥∥∥2 dsdt
)
<∞,
and
(3.28) β = ‖B⊺‖2‖G‖2
∫ T
0
‖eA
⊺(T−t)‖2dt <∞.
Finally, upon substituting (3.22) into (3.3), as ω˜ does not vanish on B, we have
that
(3.29) 〈DJ(u∗), ω˜〉 = E
[∫ T
0
ω˜⊺s ω˜s ds
]
> 0,
which contradicts the assumption that 〈DJ(u∗), ω〉 = 0, for all ω ∈ U .
To demonstrate the candidate control u∗ in (3.21) is indeed admissible, we first
see that as all processes in the rhs are F -measurable, so is the candidate u∗. Moreover,
using the triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have E[
∫ T
0
u∗⊺t u
∗
tdt] <
∞ and hence u∗ ∈ U .
Theorem 3.4 (LQG State Feedback Optimal Control). For the LQG system
(3.1)-(3.2), the optimal control action is given by the linear state feedback control
(3.30) u∗t = −R
−1 (N⊺ x∗t − n+B
⊺ [Π(t)x∗t + s(t)]) ,
where Π(t) and s(t) are deterministic functions satisfying the ODEs
(3.31) ρΠ(t) = Π˙(t) + Π(t)A+A⊺Π(t)− (Π(t)B +N)R−1(B⊺Π(t) +N⊺) +Q,
(3.32) ρs(t) = s˙(t) +
[
(A−BR−1N⊺)⊺ −Π(t)BR−1B⊺
]
s(t)
+ Π(t)(b(t) +BR−1n) +NR−1n− η,
subject to the terminal conditions Π(T ) = G and s(T ) = 0.

Proof. Define the process (pt)t∈T by
pt = e
ρt
(
e−A
⊺tMt −
∫ t
0
e−ρseA
⊺(s−t)(Qx∗s +Nu
∗
s − η)ds
)
.(3.33)
It corresponds to the adjoint process for the system (3.1)-(3.2) resulting from the
stochastic maximum principle. Next, set
pt = Π(t)x
∗
t + s(t),(3.34)
where Π(t) ∈ Rn×n and s(t) ∈ Rn are deterministic functions of time which are to be
determined. Substituting this expression into (3.19) gives
(3.35) u∗t = −R
−1
[
N⊺x∗t − n+B
⊺
(
Π(t)x∗t + s(t)
)]
.
Next, differentiating both sides of (3.34) and substituting (3.1) and (3.35) yield
(3.36) dpt =
[(
Π˙(t) + Π(t)A−Π(t)BR−1N −Π(t)BR−1B⊺Π(t)
)
x∗t
−Π(t)BR−1B⊺s(t) + Π(t)b +Π(t)BR−1n+ s˙(t)
]
dt+Π(t)σ(t)dwt .
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Differentiating both sides of (3.33) then results in
dpt = (ρpt −A
⊺pt −Qx
∗
t −Nu
∗
t + η)dt + e
ρte−A
⊺tdMt.(3.37)
The martingale representation theorem states there exists an F -adapted process
(Zt)t∈T such that
(3.38) Mt =M0 +
∫ t
0
Zs dws.
Substituting (3.34), (3.35) and (3.38) into (3.37) yields
(3.39) dpt =
[(
ρΠ(t) −Q+NR−1N⊺ +NR−1B⊺Π(t)−A⊺Π(t)
)
x∗t + ρs(t)
+ (N⊺R−1B⊺ −A⊺)s(t) + η −NR−1n
]
dt+ qtdwt,
where qt = e
ρte−A
⊺tZt.
Finally, for (3.36) and (3.39) to be equal, the corresponding drift and diffusion
terms must be equal. Hence,
(3.40) qt = Π(t)σ(t),
(3.41){
ρΠ(t) = Π˙(t) + Π(t)A +A⊺Π(t)− (Π(t)B +N)R−1(B⊺Π(t) +N⊺) +Q,
Π(T ) = G,
and
(3.42)


ρs(t) = s˙(t) +
[
(A−BR−1N⊺)⊺ −Π(t)BR−1B⊺
]
s(t)
+Π(t)
(
b(t) +BR−1n
)
+NR−1n− η,
s(T ) = 0,
which completes the proof.
Remark 3.5 (Finite Horizon LQG Systems). Typically, the cost functional for
finite horizon LQG systems contain no discount factor, i.e. ρ = 0, and in this case,
the Riccati and offset equations (3.31)-(3.32) reduce to
(3.43)


−Π˙(t) = Π(t)A+ A⊺Π(t)− (Π(t)B +N)R−1(B⊺Π(t) +N⊺) +Q,
−s˙(t) = [(A−BR−1N⊺)⊺ −Π(t)BR−1B⊺]s(t)
+ Π(t)(b(t) +BR−1n) +NR−1n− η,
subject to the terminal conditions Π(T ) = G, s(T ) = 0.
Remark 3.6 (Infinite Horizon LQG Systems). For Infinite horizon LQG systems
where the terminal time T in (3.2) is set to infinity, the terminal cost is set to zero.
In this case, the cost functional is
(3.44) J(u) = 12E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
x⊺tQxt + 2x
⊺
tNut + u
⊺
tRut − 2x
⊺
t η − 2u
⊺
t n
}
dt
]
,
The dynamics (3.1) remains the same in infinite horizon LQG systems.
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Assumption 3.7. The pair (L,A− (ρ/2)I) is detectable where L = Q1/2.
Assumption 3.8. The pair (A− (ρ/2)I, B) is stabilizable.
Given that Assumptions 3.7-3.8 hold, for infinite horizon LQG systems governed by
(3.1) and (3.44), the optimal control action is given by (3.30), where the steady state
Riccati matrix Π satisfies an algebraic Riccati equation given by
(3.45) ρΠ = ΠA+A⊺Π− (ΠB +N)R−1(B⊺Π+N⊺) +Q,
and the steady state offset vector s(t) satisfies the differential equation
(3.46)
ρs(t) = s˙(t) + [(A−BR−1N⊺)⊺−ΠBR−1B⊺]s(t) +Π(M(t) +BR−1n)+NR−1n− η,
see e.g., [1].
4. Major Minor LQG mean-field Game Systems. In this section, we use
the convex analysis method introduced in Section 3 to derive the best response strate-
gies for major minor LQG MFG (MM LQG MFG) problems addressed in [18]. An
important distinguishing feature of our approach is that we impose no assumption on
the evolution of the mean-field beforehand.
4.1. Dynamics. We consider a large population N of minor agents denoted by
Ai, i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N}, N < ∞, with a major agent denoted by A0, where agents
are subject to stochastic linear dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Each agent
is coupled to other agents through their dynamics and cost functional. Both types of
coupling occur through the average state of minor agents, i.e. the empirical mean-
field.
Major and minor agents’ states are assumed, respectively, to satisfy
dx0t = [A0 x
0
t + F0 x
(N)
t +B0 u
0
t + b0(t)] dt+ σ0 dw
0
t ,(4.1)
dxit = [Ak x
i
t + Fk x
(N)
t +Bk u
i
t + bk(t)] dt+ σk dw
i
t,(4.2)
for t ∈ T, i ∈ N, and the subscript k, k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}, K ≤ N , denotes
the type of a minor agent. Here xit ∈ R
n, i ∈ N0 := {0, . . . , N}, are the states,
(uit)t∈T ∈ R
m, i ∈ N0, are the control inputs, w = {(w
i
t)t∈T, i ∈ N0} denotes (N + 1)
independent standard Wiener processes in Rr, where wi is progressively measurable
with respect to the filtration Fw := (Fwt )t∈T. Moreover, x
(N)
t :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i
t denotes
the average state of the minor agents. All matrices in (4.1) and (4.2) are constant
and of appropriate dimension; vectors b0(t), and bk(t) are deterministic functions of
time.
4.1.1. Agents types. Minor agents are given in K ≤ N distinct types. The
index set Ik is defined as
Ik = {i : θi = θ
(k), i ∈ N}, k ∈ K,
where θ(k) ∈ Θ for k ∈ K and Θ is the parameter set. The cardinality of Ik is denoted
by Nk = |Ik|. Then, π
N = (πN1 , ..., π
N
K ), π
N
k =
Nk
N , k ∈ K, denotes the empirical
distribution of the parameters (θ1, ..., θN ) obtained by sampling the initial conditions
independently of the Wiener processes of all agents.
Assumption 4.1. There exists π such that lim
N→∞
πN = π a.s.
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4.1.2. Control σ-Fields. For any finite T , we denote (i) the natural filtration
generated by Ai’s state (x
i
t)t∈T by F
i := (F it )t∈T, i ∈ N, (ii) the natural filtration
generated by the major agent’s state (x0t )t∈T by F
0 := (F0t )t∈T, and (iii) the natural
filtration generated by the states of all agents ((xit)i∈N0)t∈T by F
g := (Fgt )t∈T.
Next, we introduce three admissible control sets. First, U0,L denotes the set of
controls based on the local information set of the major agent and consists of the set of
linear feedback control laws u0 that are adapted to F0 such that E[
∫ T
0 u
0⊺
t ut dt] <∞.
Second, for each i ∈ N, U i,L denotes the set of controls based on the local information
set of Ai and consists of the linear feedback control laws adapted to the filtration
F i,r := (F i,rt )t∈T, where F
i,r := F i ∨F0, such that E[
∫ T
0
ui⊺t u
i
t dt] <∞. Third, U
N,L
g
denotes the set of linear feedback controls u that are adapted to the general filtration
Fg := (Fgt )t∈T, F
g := ∨i∈N0F
i, such that E[
∫ T
0 u
⊺
t ut dt] <∞.
4.2. Cost functionals. We denote the norm ‖a‖2B := a
⊺Ba, where a and B
are a vector and a matrix of appropriate dimensions, respectively. Then the major
agent’s cost functional for the (finite) large population stochastic game is
(4.3) JN0 (u
0, u−0) = 12E
[
‖x0T − Φ
(N)
T ‖
2
G0 +
∫ T
0
{
‖x0t − Φ
(N)
t ‖
2
Q0
+ 2
(
x0t − Φ
(N)
t
)⊺
N0u
0
t + ‖u
0
t‖
2
R0
}
dt
]
,
where
(4.4) Φ
(N)
t := H0 x
(N)
t + η0.
Assumption 4.2. G0 ≥ 0, R0 > 0, and Q0 −N0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0 ≥ 0.
A minor agent Ai, i ∈ N, such that i ∈ Ik, cost functional for the (finite) large
population stochastic game is
(4.5) JNi (u
i, u−i) = 12 E
[
‖xiT −Ψ
(N)
T ‖
2
Gk +
∫ T
0
{
‖xit −Ψ
(N)
t ‖
2
Qk
+ 2
(
xit −Ψ
(N)
t
)⊺
Nku
i
t + ‖u
i
t‖
2
Rk
}
dt
]
,
where
(4.6) Ψ
(N)
t := Hk x
0
t + Hˆk x
(N)
t + ηk.
Assumption 4.3. Gk ≥ 0, Rk > 0, and Qk −NkR
−1
k N
⊺
k ≥ 0, for k ∈ K.
Note that the major and minor agents are coupled to one another through x
(N)
t which
appears in both the dynamics (4.1)-(4.2) and cost functionals (4.3)-(4.5).
4.3. Solutions to Major Minor LQG MFG Problems. In the mean-field
game methodology with a major agent [25, 18], we first solve the infinite population
version of the stochastic game. This is achieved by replacing the average terms in
the finite population dynamics and cost functional by their infinite population limit
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called the mean-field. Then in the case of LQG MFG systems, we extend the major
agent’s state to include the mean-field and extend the minor agent’s state to include
the major agent’s state and mean-field. The result is a stochastic control problem for
each agent (rather than a stochastic game), but the problems are linked through the
major agent’s state and mean-field. Next, we solve these stochastic control problems
and the resulting fixed point problem to obtain a consistent mean-field. Finally, we
apply the infinite population best response strategies to the finite population system
and demonstrate that this results in an ǫ-Nash equilibrium [18].
By introducing more general cost functionals and state dynamics we generalize
Theorem 10 in [18], which provides the control laws that yield the infinite population
Nash equilibrium and the resulting finite population ǫ-Nash equilibrium. We present
a new proof using a convex analysis method to derive the best response strategy
for every agent without any explicit assumption on the mean-field dynamics – which
contrasts with the classical approaches (see e.g. [11, 12, 13, 16]).
Theorem 4.4 (ǫ-Nash Equilibrium for LQG MFG Systems). Assume the condi-
tions of [18] for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium hold. The system of
equations (4.1)-(4.6) together with the mean-field consistency equations (4.58)-(4.59)
generate a set of control laws U∞MF , {u
i,∗; i ∈ N0}, given by (4.25) and (4.41), such
that
(i) The set of infinite population control laws U∞MF , {u
i,∗; i ∈ N0} yields the
infinite population Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
J∞i (u
i,∗, u−i,∗) = inf
ui∈U∞,Lg
J∞i (u
i, u−i,∗).
(ii) All agent systems Ai, i ∈ N0, are second order stable.
(iii) The set of control laws UNMF , {u
i,∗; i ∈ N0}, 1 ≤ N < ∞, form an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for all ǫ, i.e., for all ǫ > 0, there exists N(ǫ) such that for all
N ≥ N(ǫ)
JNi (u
i,∗, u−i,∗)− ǫ ≤ inf
ui∈UN,Lg
JNi (u
i, u−i,∗) ≤ JNi (u
i,∗, u−i,∗).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts:
(I) Show that the set of control laws U∞MF forms a Nash equilibrium for the
infinite population system.
(II) Show that when a finite subset of the control laws UNMF is applied to the finite
population system, all agent systems are second order stable, and the control
laws yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Part (II) is established by the standard approximation analysis parallel to that in [18]
and is omitted here. In this section we prove part (I) by using a novel convex analysis
approach to retrieve the set of best response strategies U∞MF which yields the Nash
equilibrium. This part is further broken into three parts:
(i)Major Agent: Infinite Population For the infinite population problem for the
major agent, we follow the steps below:
(i.a) Perturb the major agent’s control action by ǫ0 in the direction ω0 ∈ U0;
(i.b) Follow the effect of the major agent’s control action perturbation on every
minor agent and obtain the resulting perturbed mean-field x¯ǫ0t ;
(i.c) Extend the major agent’s state to include the joint dynamics of the major
agent’s state and mean-field;
(i.d) Apply Theorem 3.3 to obtain the best response strategy for the major agent.
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We now carry out these steps in turn.
Step (i.a): The major agent’s state x0,ǫ0t subject to the perturbed control action
u0t + ǫ0 ω
0
t , for ω
0
t ∈ U
0, in the infinite population limit satisfies
(4.7) dx0,ǫ0t = [A0 x
0,ǫ0
t + F
π
0 x¯
ǫ0
t +B0 (u
0
t + ǫ0ω
0
t ) + b0(t)]dt + σ0 dw
0
t ,
where Fπ0 = π ⊗ F0, and x¯
ǫ0
t denotes the perturbed mean-field resulting from the
major agent’s perturbed control action.
Step (i.b): The resulting minor agent’s state xi,ǫ0 , subject to an arbitrary control
ui ∈ U , due to the major agent’s perturbation satisfies
(4.8) dxi,ǫ0t = [Ak x
i,ǫ0
t dt+ F
π
k x¯
ǫ0
t dt+Gk x
0,ǫ0
t +Bk u
i
t + bk(t)]dt+ σk dw
i
t,
for all i ∈ N. The empirical average of the states of the minor agents of subpopulation
k ∈ K is defined as
x
(N),k
t =
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
xit,(4.9)
and we define the vector x
(N)
t = [x
(N),1
t , x
(N),2
t , . . . , x
(N),K
t ], where the pointwise in
time limit (in quadratic mean) of x
(N)
t , if it exists, is called the state mean-field of
the system and is denoted by x¯⊺t = [(x¯
1
t )
⊺, ..., (x¯Kt )
⊺].
Similarly, the empirical average of the control actions of the minor agents of
subpopulation k ∈ K is defined as
u
(N),k
t =
1
Nk
∑
i∈Ik
uit,(4.10)
and we define the vector u
(N)
t = [u
(N),1
t , u
(N),2
t , . . . , u
(N),K
t ], where the pointwise in
time limit (in quadratic mean) of u
(N)
t , if it exists, is called the control mean-field of
the system and is denoted by u¯⊺t = [(u¯
1
t )
⊺, ..., (u¯Kt )
⊺].
We denote the perturbed mean-field for subpopulation k ∈ K by (x¯k,ǫ0t ). Taking
the average of (4.8) over i ∈ Ik, and then its L
2 limit as Nk →∞, we obtain
(4.11) dx¯k,ǫ0t =
{[
(Ak ek + F
π
k ) x¯
ǫ0
t +Gk x
0,ǫ0
t
]
+Bk u¯
(k)
t + bk(t)
}
dt,
where ek = [0n×n, ..., 0n×n, In, 0n×n, ..., 0n×n], which has the n×n identity matrix In
at the kth block. Next, we stack the perturbed subpopulation mean-fields into the
perturbed mean-field vector (x¯ǫ0t )
⊺ := [(x¯1,ǫ0t )
⊺, . . . , (x¯K,ǫ0t )
⊺]. Hence x¯ǫ0 satisfies the
SDE
(4.12) dx¯ǫ0t = A˘ x¯
ǫ0
t dt+ G˘ x
0,ǫ0
t dt+ B˘ u¯tdt+ m˘t dt,
where as described below (4.10), u¯t = [u¯
1
t , . . . , u¯
K
t ]
⊺, and
(4.13)
A˘ =


A1e1 + F
π
1
...
AKeK + F
π
K

 , G˘ =


G1
...
GK

 , B˘ =


B1 0
. . .
0 BK

 , m˘t =


b1(t)
...
bK(t)

 .
Step (i.c): We extend the perturbed major agent’s state with the perturbed
mean-field to form (X0,ǫ0t )
⊺ :=
[
(x0,ǫ0t )
⊺, (x¯ǫ0t )
⊺
]
, which then satisfies the SDE
(4.14) dX0,ǫ0t =
(
A˜0X
0,ǫ0
t + B0 u
0
t + B˜0 u¯t + ǫ0 B0 ω
0
t + M˜0
)
dt+Σ0 dW
0
t ,
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where
A˜0 =
[
A0 F
π
0
G˘ A˘
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0
]
, B˜0 =
[
0
B˘
]
,(4.15)
B0 =
[
B0
0
]
, M˜0 =
[
b0(t)
b(t)
]
, Σ0 =
[
σ0 0
0 0
]
, W 0t =
[
w0t
0
]
.(4.16)
Given the major agent’s perturbed extended state, the corresponding cost func-
tional for the infinite population limit is
(4.17) J∞0 (u
0 + ǫ0ω
0) = 12E
[
(X0,ǫ0T )
⊺G0X
0,ǫ0
T +
∫ T
0
{
(X0,ǫ0s )
⊺Q0X
0,ǫ0
s
+ 2(X0,ǫ0s )
⊺N0(u
0
s + ǫ0ω
0
s) + (u
0
s + ǫ0ω
0
s)
⊺R0(u
0
s + ǫ0ω
0
s)
− 2(X0,ǫ0s )
⊺η¯0 − 2(u
0
s + ǫ0ω
0
s)
⊺n¯0
}
ds
]
,
where the corresponding weight matrices are
G0 = [In,−H
π
0 ]
⊺G0 [In,−H
π
0 ] , Q0 = [In,−H
π
0 ]
⊺Q0 [In,−H
π
0 ] ,(4.18a)
N0 = [In,−H
π
0 ]
⊺
N0, η¯0 = [In,−H
π
0 ]
⊺
Q0η0, n¯0 = N
⊺
0 η0.(4.18b)
Following along the lines of the proof for Theorem 3.2 (with ρ = 0 ), the Gaˆteaux
derivative DJ∞0 (u
0) of the major agent’s cost functional in the direction of ω0t ∈ U
0
is given by
(4.19) 〈DJ∞0 (u
0), ω0〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
(ω0t )
⊺
{
N
⊺
0X
0
t +R0u
0
t − n¯0
+ B⊺0
(
e−A˜
⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
0
(s−t)(Q0X
0
s + N0u
0
s − η¯0)ds
)}
dt
]
,
where
(4.20) M0t = E
[
eA˜
⊺
0
TG0X
0
T +
∫ T
0
eA˜
⊺
0
s(Q0X
0
s + N0u
0
s − η¯0)ds
∣∣∣F0t ],
and the unperturbed major agent’s extended state X0t is given by (4.14) where ǫ0 is
set to zero, i.e.
(4.21) dX0t = A˜0X
0
t dt+ B0u
0
tdt+ B˜0u¯tdt+ M˜0dt+Σ0dW
0
t .
Step (i.d): Since DJ∞0 (u
0) has the same structural form as DJ(u) in (3.3), from
the proof of Theorem 3.3, the optimal control action for the major agent in the infinite
population limit is
(4.22)
u0,∗t = −R
−1
0
[
N
⊺
0X
0,∗
t − n¯0+B
⊺
0
(
e−A˜
⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
0
(s−t)(Q0X
0,∗
s +N0u
0,∗
s − η¯0)ds
)]
.
Following the steps in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we define the major agent’s adjoint
process (p0t )t∈T by
p0t = e
−A˜⊺
0
tM0t −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
0
(s−t)(Q0X
0,∗
s + N0u
0,∗
s − η¯0).(4.23)
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and adopt the ansatz
(4.24) p0t = Π0(t)X
0,∗
t + s0(t).
This provides us with the state feedback control action for the major agent given by
(4.25) u0,∗t = −R
−1
0
[
N
⊺
0X
0
t − n¯0 + B
⊺
0
(
Π0(t)X
0,∗
t + s0(t)
)]
.
Next differentiating both sides of (4.23) and using the martingale representation the-
orem we find that major agent’s adjoint process satisfies the SDE
(4.26) dp0t =
[
−(Q0 + A˜
⊺
0 Π0(t))X
0
t − A˜
⊺
0 s0(t)
]
dt+ q0t dW
0
t .
Moreover, differentiating both sides of (4.24) and substituting (4.21) implies p0 also
satisfies the SDE
(4.27) dp0t =
[(
Π˙0 +Π0 A˜0 −Π0 B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0 Π0
)
X0t +Π0 B˜0 u¯t
+Π0
(
M˜0(t)−Π0 B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0s0
)
+ s˙0(t)
]
dt+Π0Σ0(t) dW
0
t .
Determining Π0(t) and s0(t) requires knowing u¯. To determine this, we next specify
the optimal control action for every minor agent.
(ii)Minor Agent: Infinite Population For the minor agent’s infinite population
problem we follow the steps below:
(ii.a) Perturb a minor agent’s control action by ǫi in the direction ωi ∈ Ui;
(ii.b) Follow the effect of the perturbed control action on the major agent’s and all
minor agents’ states and determine the perturbed mean-field x¯ǫit ;
(ii.c) Extend the minor agents’ state to include the joint dynamics of the minor
agent, major agent, and mean-field;
(ii.d) Apply Theorem 3.3 to obtain the best response strategy for the minor agent.
We now carry out these steps in turn.
Step (ii.a): A minor agent from subpopulation k, i.e. Ai, i ∈ Ik, has a perturbed
state (xi,ǫi)t∈T subject to the control action u
i
t + ǫiω
i
t, where ω
i ∈ U i, that satisfies
the SDE
(4.28) dxi,ǫit =
[
Ak x
i,ǫi
t + F
π
k x¯
ǫi
t +Gk x
0
t +Bk(u
i
t + ǫi ω
i
t) + bk(t)
]
dt+ σk dw
i
t,
where Fπk = π ⊗ Fk.
Step (ii.b): To obtain subpopulation k’s perturbed mean-field x¯k,ǫit , we first take
the average of minor agents’ states x
(j)
t over subpopulation k where Aj ’s, i 6= j ∈ Ik,
state satisfies (4.2) while Ai’s state satisfies (4.28), and then we take its limit as
Nk →∞, to find
(4.29) dx¯k,ǫit =
[
(Ak ek + F
π
k ) x¯
ǫi
t +Gk x
0
t +Bk u¯
k
t + bk(t)
]
dt.
Stacking the perturbed subpopulation mean-fields into the vector valued process(
(x¯ǫit )
⊺ :=
[
(x¯1,ǫit )
⊺, . . . , (x¯K,ǫit )
⊺
])
t∈T
and using the above SDE, we find that x¯ǫit sat-
isfies the SDE
(4.30) dx¯ǫit =
[
A˘ x¯ǫit + G˘ x
0
t + B˘ u¯t + m˘t
]
dt,
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where the coefficient matrices A˘, G˘, B˘, and m˘t are given in (4.13).
From (4.29) and (4.30), we see that the mean-field, and hence the major agent’s
dynamics, are not impacted by the perturbation of a minor agent’s control action, as
heuristically expected, because limNk→∞
ǫiω
i
t
Nk
= 0. Therefore x¯ǫit = x¯t and x
0,ǫi
t = x
0
t
for any i ∈ N.
Step (ii.c): Next, we extend the minor agent’s state to include the major agent’s
state and the mean-field, which we assume to exist. Hence, Ai’s perturbed extended
state
(
(X i,ǫit )
⊺ ,
[
(xi,ǫit )
⊺, (x0t )
⊺, (x¯t)
⊺
])
t∈T
is
(4.31) dX i,ǫit =
(
A˜kX
i,ǫi
t + Bk u
i
t + ǫi Bk ω
i
tdt+ B˜k u¯t + M˜k(t)
)
dt+Σk dW
i
t ,
where
A˜k =
[
Ak [Hk F
π
k ]
0 A˜0 − B0R
−1
0 N0 − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0Π0
]
, Bk =
[
Bk
0
]
, B˜k =
[
0
B˜0
]
,
M˜k =
[
bk(t)
M˜0 − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0s0
]
, Σk =
[
σk 0
0 Σ0
]
, W it =
[
wit
W 0t
]
.(4.32)
The perturbed infinite population cost functional for Ai, i ∈ N, is
(4.33) J∞i (u
i + ǫiω
i) = 12E
[
(X i,ǫiT )
⊺GkX
i,ǫi
T +
∫ T
0
{
(X i,ǫis )
⊺QkX
i,ǫi
s
+ 2(X i,ǫis )
⊺ Nk (u
i
s + ǫiω
i
t) + (u
i
s + ǫiω
i
t)
⊺Rk (u
i
s + ǫiω
i
t)
− 2(X i,ǫis )
⊺ η¯k − 2(u
i
s + ǫiω
i
t)
⊺ n¯k
}
ds
]
,
where the corresponding weight matrices are
Gk = [In,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ]
⊺Gk[In,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ],(4.34a)
Qk = [In,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ]
⊺Qk[In,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ],(4.34b)
Nk = [In,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ]
⊺N0, η¯k = [In,−Hk, Hˆ
π
k ]
⊺Qkηk, n¯k = N
⊺
k ηk.(4.34c)
Step (ii.d): To determine the optimal control ui,∗t for Ai, i ∈ N, first, following
the lines of the proof for Theorem 3.2, the Gaˆteaux derivative at ui ∈ U i in the
direction ωi ∈ U i of (4.33) is
(4.35) 〈DJ∞i (u
i), ωi〉 = E
[ ∫ T
0
(ωit)
⊺
{
N
⊺
k X
i
t +Rk u
i
t − n¯k
+ B⊺k
(
e−A˜
⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
k
(s−t)
(
QkX
i
s + Nk u
i
s − η¯k
)
ds
)}
dt
]
,
where
M it = E
[
eA˜
⊺
k
T GkX
i
T +
∫ T
0
eA˜
⊺
k
s
(
QkX
i
s + Nk u
i
s − η¯k
)
ds
∣∣∣F it
]
,(4.36)
and, by setting ǫi to zero in (4.31), the unperturbed minor agent’s extended state
satisfies the SDE
(4.37) dX it =
(
A˜kX
i
t + Bk u
i
t + B˜k u¯t + M˜k(t)
)
dt+Σk dW
i
t .
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Again since DJ∞i (u
i) has the same structural form as DJ(u) in (3.3), according to
the proof of Theorem 3.3, the minor agent’s optimal control action is
(4.38)
ui,∗t = −R
−1
k
[
N
⊺
k X
i,∗
t − n¯k
+B⊺k
(
e−A˜
⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
k
(s−t)
(
QkX
i,∗
s + Nk u
i,∗
s − η¯k
)
ds
)]
.
Then following the steps in the proof of Theorem 3.4, the adjoint process of Ai is
given by
(4.39) pit = e
−A˜⊺
k
tM it −
∫ t
0
eA˜
⊺
k
(s−t)
(
QkX
i,∗
s + Nk u
i,∗
s − η¯k
)
ds,
and we adopt the ansatz
(4.40) pit = Πk(t)X
i,∗
t + sk(t).
Consequently, the control action (4.38) can be written in the linear state feedback
form
ui,∗t = −R
−1
k
[
N
⊺
kX
i,∗
t − n¯k + B
⊺
k
(
Πk(t)X
i,∗
t + sk(t)
)]
.(4.41)
To specify Πk(t) and sk(t), we differentiate both sides of (4.39) and use the martingale
representation theorem to obtain the SDE
(4.42) dpit =
[
−
(
Qk + A˜
⊺
kΠk(t)
)
X i,∗t − A˜
⊺
ks(t)
]
dt+ qitdW
i
t .
Furthermore, differentiating both sides of (4.40) and substituting (4.37) we obtain
the SDE
(4.43)
dpit =
[ (
Π˙k +Πk A˜k −Πk Bk R
−1
k B
⊺
k Πk
)
X it −Πk Bk R
−1
k B
⊺
k s(t)
+ Πk M˜k(t) + Πk B˜k u¯t + s˙k(t)
]
dt+Πk Σk(t) dW
i
t .
To determine Πk(t) and sk(t) we need to first obtain u¯t.
(iii) Mean-field and Consistency Equations To obtain u¯t, we first define
Πk =

Πk,11 Πk,12 Πk,13Πk,21 Πk,22 Πk,23
Πk,31 Πk,32 Πk,33

 , k ∈ K,(4.44)
where Π11,Π22 ∈ R
n×n, Π33 ∈ R
nK×nK . Then average (4.41) over all i ∈ Ik (i.e., all
agents in subpopulation k) to obtain
u
(Nk)
t = −R
−1
k

K⊺

x(Nk)tx0t
x¯t

− n¯k + B⊺ksk

 .(4.45)
where K := Nk +
[
Πk,11 Πk,12 Πk,13
]⊺
Bk. Next (4.45) as Nk → ∞ converges in
quadratic mean to
u¯
(k)
t = −R
−1
k

K⊺

x¯(k)tx0t
x¯t

− n¯k + B⊺ksk

 .(4.46)
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Substituting (4.46) into (4.27) and equating (4.27) with (4.26) results in
(4.47)
{
−Π˙0 = Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (Π0B0 + N0)R
−1
0 (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0) +Q0,
Π0(T ) = G0,
(4.48)


−s˙0(t) =
[(
A0 − B0 R
−1
0 N
⊺
0
)⊺
−Π0 B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0
]
s0(t)
+ Π0
(
M0(t) + B0 R
−1
0 n¯0
)
+ N0R
−1
0 n¯0 − η¯0,
s0(T ) =0,
where
A0 =
[
A0 F
π
0
Gk −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,12 Ak + F
π
k −BkR
−1
k B
⊺(Πk,11 +Πk,13)
]
,(4.49)
and M0 =
[
b0(t)
bk(t)−BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ksk(t)
]
.(4.50)
Moreover, substituting (4.46) in (4.43), and equating (4.43) with (4.42) gives
(4.51)
{
−Π˙k = ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (ΠkBk + Nk)R
−1
k (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k) +Qk,
Πk(T ) = Gk,
(4.52)


−s˙k(t) = [(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ −ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k]sk(t)
= +Πk(Mk(t) + BkR
−1
k n¯k) + NkR
−1
k n¯k − η¯k,
sk(T ) = 0,
where
Ak =
[
Ak [Hk F
π
k ]
0 A0 − B0R
−1
0 N0 − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0Π0
]
, Mk =
[
bk(t)
M0 − B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0s0
]
.
(4.53)
Finally, the mean-field equation is obtained substituting (4.46) into (4.21) so that
(4.54) dx¯
(k)
t =
(
Fπk + [Ak −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11)]ek −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,13
)
x¯
(k)
t dt
+ (Hk −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,12)x
0
t dt+
(
bk +BkR
−1
k n¯k −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ksk
)
dt,
where we denote
A¯k = F
π
k + [Ak −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11)]ek −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,13,(4.55)
G¯k = Hk −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,12,(4.56)
m¯k = bk +BkR
−1
k n¯k −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ksk(4.57)
for all k ∈ K. Therefore, the set of major minor mean-field fixed-point equations
determining A¯, G¯, m¯ (known as the consistency equations) can be written compactly
as


−Π˙0 = Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (Π0B0 + N0)R
−1
0 (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0) +Q0, Π0(T ) = G0,
−Π˙k = ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (ΠkBk + Nk)R
−1
k (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k) +Qk, Πk(T ) = Gk,
A¯k = F
π
k + [Ak −BkR
−1
k (N
⊺
k,1 +B
⊺
kΠk,11)]ek −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,13 ,
G¯k = Hk −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
kΠk,12 ,
(4.58)
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

−s˙0(t) = [(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0)
⊺ −Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0 ]s0(t)
+Π0(M0(t) + B0R
−1
0 n¯0) + N0R
−1
0 n¯0 − η¯0, s0(T ) = 0,
−s˙k(t) = [(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ −ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k]sk(t)
+Πk(Mk(t) + BkR
−1
k n¯k) + NkR
−1
k n¯k − η¯k, sk(T ) = 0,
m¯k = bk +BkR
−1
k n¯k −BkR
−1
k B
⊺
ksk,
(4.59)
for all k ∈ K.
Remark 4.5 (Infinite Horizon LQG MFG Systems). For infinite horizon LQG
MFG systems where the terminal time is set equal to infinity, and hence the ter-
minal cost turns to zero, the major agent’s infinite horizon cost functionals is
(4.60)
JN0 (u
0, u−0) = 12E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖x0t−Φ(x
(N)
t )‖
2
Q0+2
(
x0t − Φ(x
(N)
t )
)⊺
N0u
0
t+‖u
0
t‖
2
R0
}
dt
]
.
Similarly, the discounted infinite horizon cost functional for Ai, i ∈ N, is given by
(4.61)
JNi (u
i, u−i) = 12E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖xit−Ψ(x
(N)
t )‖
2
Qk +2
(
xit −Ψ(x
(N)
t )
)⊺
Nku
i
t+‖u
i
t‖
2
Rk
}
dt
]
.
The major-minor agent dynamics in (4.1)-(4.2) remain the same in the infinite horizon
LQG MFG systems.
Assumption 4.6. The pair (La,A0 − (ρ/2)I) is detectable, and for each k ∈
K, the pair (Lb,Ak − (ρ/2)I) is detectable, where La = Q
1/2
0 [I,−H
π
0 ] and Lb =
Q
1/2
k [I,−Hk,−Hˆ
π
k ].
Assumption 4.7. The pair (A0 − (ρ/2)I,B0) is stabilizable and (Ak − (ρ/2)I,Bk)
is stabilizable for each k ∈ K.
Given that Assumptions 3.7-3.8 hold, for the major agent’s system (4.1), (4.60), the
best response strategy is given by (4.25), where the steady state Riccati matrix Π0
satisfies an algebraic Riccati equation given by
(4.62) ρΠ0 = Π0A0 + A
⊺
0Π0 − (Π0B0 + N0)R
−1
0 (B
⊺
0Π0 + N
⊺
0) +Q0,
and the steady state offset vector s0 satisfies the differential equation
(4.63) ρs0(t) = s˙0(t) + [(A0 − B0R
−1
0 N
⊺
0)
⊺ −Π0B0R
−1
0 B
⊺
0 ]s0(t)
+ Π0(M0(t) + B0R
−1
0 n¯0) + N0R
−1
0 n¯0 − η¯0.
Similarly, for Ai’s system (4.2), (4.61), i ∈ N, the best response strategy is given
by (4.41), where the steady state Riccati matrix Πk and offset matrix sk satisfy the
following algebraic Riccati equation and differential offset equation.
(4.64)

ρΠk = ΠkAk + A
⊺
kΠk − (ΠkBk + Nk)R
−1
k (B
⊺
kΠk + N
⊺
k) +Qk,
ρsk(t) = s˙k(t) + [(Ak − BkR
−1
k N
⊺
k)
⊺ −ΠkBkR
−1
k B
⊺
k]sk(t)
+Πk(Mk(t) + BkR
−1
k n¯k) + NkR
−1
k n¯k − η¯k, sk(T ) = 0,
for all k ∈ K.
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